näää det blir för mycket skräp ... samlat blir det som att "PALLA"... så herrarna får själva läsa. Jag väljer Höffe som kan sin Kant och kan ge er svar på det ni påstår - felaktigt så klart.
https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/defa ... ok4you.pdfs. 27-29
Theme V: T
he first Critique attempts to resolve the fundamental dispute between philosophers by attacking its original root in the internal contradic- tions of reason.In this connection Hume had already pointed out the ‘eternal con- tradictions and disputes’ of philosophy (cf. B 730), but he had been quite unable to specify or resolve them properly within the medium of reason itself. He can only free himself from the ‘melancholy’ into which he has therefore fallen through an appealing, though intrin- sically non-philosophical, strategy of social diversion: ‘I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends’ (A Treatise of Human Nature I, IV, vii). This approach can readily be presented as a new way of criticising the metaphysical enterprise. Since metaphysics, with all its contradictions, only arises once we abandon the shared world of everyday communication, such contradictions will vanish if we simply renounce metaphysics and turn back to the world of experience and the senses, the world we can all already enjoy in its purely sensuous character. But this kind of critique of metaphysics intrinsically overlooks the origin of these contradictions in the heart of reason itself.
And they arise not from the fact that we tend to abandon our shared experience of the world, but rather from our inevitable need to question further. In this regard, as Hume himself recognises, the appeal to social diversion is less of a proper decision than an act of repression which can afford only temporary relief from the difficulty.
In this connection Kant rightly speaks, therefore, of ‘activity and enter- tainment, which is actually a mere diversion undertaken in order to silence the troublesome call of reason’ (Prol., IV: 381).
Kant’s alternative strategy of seeking a solution to these difficul- ties within reason itself allows him to make three specific advances over Hume. He identifies the relevant contradictions with greater precision, he diagnoses their genuine source, and he indicates the appropriate therapeutic response. In place of the old pre-Humean ‘speculative wars’ of philosophy and of Hume’s essentially pragmatic repression of the problem, Kant proposes something that he had already suggested in his earlier writings (I: 7ff.; 387): a trial in a court of judgement.
The philosophical tradition has of course been famil- iar with the challenge of scepticism from the beginning. Aristotle even attempted to counter the most radical form of scepticism which had contested the very principle of non-contradiction (Metaphysics IV, 4), and Descartes’s proposal for a radical new beginning for philos- ophy was based explicitly upon the principle of doubt itself. But the innovative character of Kant’s Critique lies in the fact that he recog- nises scepticism as a logical extension of empiricism, that he directly confronts empiricism with rationalism, and overcomes the opposition between sceptical futility and dogmatic defiance (B 434) through a judicial process of examination. In the course of this examination Kant will overcome other oppositions as well, like that between (French) materialism, which denies the immortality of the soul, and the spir- itualistic metaphysics which claims to prove the reality of personal immortality.
Kant shows little interest in ‘coining new words’ since this involves ‘a claim to legislation in language that seldom succeeds’ (B 368f.). Most of his technical expressions are taken over from the modern philo- sophical tradition: ‘perception’, ‘intuition’, ‘pure’, for example, are all found in Locke’s Essay and Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais. Other expres- sions, like ‘category’, ‘transcendental’, ‘analytic’ and ‘dialectic’ come from the Aristotelian tradition of German philosophy, whereas Kant’s use of the term ‘idea’ derives directly from Plato. Some of the other technical terms of the first Critique, such as ‘amphiboly’, ‘antinomy’ and ‘paralogism’, can also be found in certain handbooks of the time, like those of Meier and Zeller, although Kant himself deploys them in subtly different ways.
The word ‘critique’, as it figures in the title of the work, derives, on the other hand, from the tradition of ars critica which goes back
to Cicero and was taken over into the French term critique in the 17th century. As the art of delivering an informed judgement concerning the value, or otherwise, of something under consideration, critique acquires an aesthetic, and pre-eminently literary, significance in Less- ing. But the term was soon extended to apply to almost everything, initially to all kinds of texts and subsequently to all kinds of tradi- tions and institutions, and eventually became a central term of the Enlightenment itself insofar as it now served to designate the capacity to distinguish between the true and false in general (cf. Tonelli 1978). Thus Kant uses the term ‘critique’ in neither a negative and destruc- tive sense nor in a positive and affirmative sense, but rather in the commonly accepted sense in which we speak of literary or artistic crit- icism as an exercise of ‘judgement’.
But Kant also deploys the term in a quite new thematic and methodological context.
