Lupia, jag orkar f.n. inte gå in på alla mina definitioner, däremot kan
härleda till Jean Gebser, som gör skillnad på magiska, mytiska, mentala och integrala förhållnigsätt. Många som tycker sig kritisera "religion" från ett "vetenskapligt" perspektiv, kritiserar egentligen inte religion, utan de kritiserar mytisk religion från ett mentalt perspektiv. Läs en längre text om hur Gebser förklarar hur medvetandet utvecklat sig genom och uttrycks genom olika kulturstadier, extremt intressant tycker jag. Läs om gebser här
En annan intressant tungviktare i just denna fråga om vetenskap och religion var Ervin Laszlo, som ibland sägs vara grundaren av systemfilosofi. Han var även en av de personer som var med och grundade integral institute. Här är en av hans böcker jag funderar på att köpa
Jag tänker här referera till hur Wilber sammanfattar de vanligaste förhållningsätten till fråga vetenskap kontra religion ifrån hans bok marrige of sense and soul. Jag är ledsen att jag referarar ett så långt stycke text, men känner på någotsätt förenklar för de människor som är seriösa och verkligen vill börja försöka förstå komplexiteten i denna fråga. Det handlar alltså inte om människor som är för vetenskap kontra människor som är för religion, även fast det kanske är de två vanligaste (och för mig personligen, mest begränsade perspektiven eftersom de båda är två extremer. Extremer tenderar trots allt fokusera ensidigt på problematiska situationer).
1. Science denies any validity to religion. This is the standard empirical and positivist approach, which became, in numerous guises, the dominant official mood of modernity. Classic variations on this theme have been given by Auguste Comte, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx, and Bertrand Russell, but they all boil down to: religion is a hangover from the childhood of humanity, on exactly the same footing as the tooth fairy. It's cute for kids but deadly for adults, and its persistence into maturity—the persistence of deeply held religious beliefs into adulthood—is a sign of pathology, lack of logical clarity, or existential inauthenticity. There are no exceptions, because there is no God. And there is no God because science registers that which is real, and no microscope and no telescope have yet spotted any "God."
2. Religion denies any validity to science. This is a typically fundamentalist retort to modernity, and is itself a by-product of modernity. By and large, classical religions never denied science—first, because science was not a threat (only with modernity does science become powerful enough to kill God); and second, because science was always held to be one of several valid modes of knowing, subservient to spiritual modes but valid nonetheless, and hence there was no reason to deny its importance.
At the same time, it should be noted that the sciences of antiquity were not nearly as impressive as what a Newton, a Galileo, or a Kepler would deliver, and thus few were the temptations to make science itself into a new religion of positivism (which is exactly what Auguste Comte would propose, with Comte himself volunteering to be, literally, the Pope of Positivism).
In any event, science in the premodern world had little inclination to deny religion and thus a drastic counterforce was uncalled for. But with the rise of modernity and its inherent claim that all religions are childish productions, many fundamentalist religions (especially Christianity and Islam) began to deny even the basic facts of science itself: evolution does not exist, the Earth was literally created in six days, radiocarbon dating is a fraud, and so on. It has been pointed out, for example, that the extremism of Islamic fundamentalists is not so much an inherent aspect of Islam (which has produced some truly glorious civilizations) as it is a product of a wild counterreaction to modernity's attempt to terrorize and kill spirituality in general. In wild panic, the fundamentalists have become counterterrorists.
This does not in any way excuse terrorism; I believe that many (but by no means all) of the religious sentiments of humankind are indeed a childish hangover and eventually need to be surrendered. Most fundamentalists, in this sense, are indeed refusing to grow up cognitively. But it does point out the intense emotions involved in this battle of modernity, this battle to find a place for both science and religion, truth and meaning, logic and God, facts and Spirit, evidence and the eternal.
3. Science is but one of several valid modes of knowing, and thus can peacefully coexist with spiritual modes. This was the standard position of most classical religions and the religions of antiquity. In fact, this is just another way of describing the Great Chain of Being, and, as you can see in Figure 1-1, science and theology and mysticism all had an important and rightful place in the Great Nest of Being.
Although this view—which is now generally called episte-mological pluralism—was the backbone of the great wisdom traditions, it collapsed with the Great Chain, upon which it depended. When modernity rejected the Great Chain, it simultaneously rejected epistemological pluralism. And modernity continues to reject epistemological pluralism in any of its forms because modernity most definitely continues to reject the Great Chain.
Nonetheless, for those scholars, theorists, and intelligent laypeople attempting to make sense of the universe in some sort of holistic or encompassing fashion, epistemological pluralism has remained one of the more appealing and sophisticated attempts to unite science and religion. Modernity itself aggressively discarded this view; but what we might call "countermodernity" or the "counterculture"—never much more than a small percentage of the total population, but one desperately looking for a way to heal modernity's fragmentations—would nevertheless continue to look to episte-mological pluralism as one of the most refined and compelling ways to proceed.
The traditional view of epistemological pluralism was given perhaps its clearest statement by such Christian mystics as St. Bonaventure and Hugh of St. Victor: every human being has the eye of flesh, the eye of mind, and the eye of contemplation. Each of these modes of knowing discloses its own corresponding dimension of being (gross, subtle, and causal), and thus each is valid and important when addressing its own realm. This gives us a balance of empirical knowledge (science], rational knowledge (logic and mathematics], and spiritual knowledge (gnosis).
The three eyes of knowing are, of course, just a simplified version of the universal Great Chain of Being. If we picture the Great Chain as having five levels (matter, body, mind, soul, and spirit), men and women have five eyes available to them (material prehension, bodily emotion, mental ideas, the soul's archetypal cognition, and spiritual gnosis). Likewise, if the Great Chain is divided into twelve levels, we have twelve eyes, or twelve levels of awareness and knowing.
Indeed, Plotinus—arguably the greatest philosopher-mystic the world has ever known—usually gave the Great Chain twelve levels: matter, life, sensation, perception, impulse, images, concepts, logical faculty, creative reason, world soul, nous, and the One. Table 2-1 shows the typical Great Nest as presented by Plotinus and Sri Aurobindo, two of its greatest representatives (the match between them is quite striking and fairly typical).
The point is that, any way we slice the great pie—three levels, five levels, twelve levels or more—men and women have available to them at least the three basic eyes of knowing: the eye of flesh (empiricism), the eye of mind (rationalism), and the eye of contemplation (mysticism), each of which is important and quite valid when dealing with its own level, but gravely confused if it attempts to see into other domains. This is the very heart of epistemological pluralism, and, as far as it goes, it is indeed quite valid.
Now, if the existence of all three eyes of knowing were a commonly accepted fact in modernity, the relation of science and religion—and their peaceful coexistence—would be no problem whatsoever. Empirical science would pronounce on the facts delivered by the eye of flesh, and religion would pronounce on the facts delivered by the eye of spirit (or the eye of contemplation). But mainstream modernity has soundly and thoroughly denied reality to the eye of spirit. Modernity recognizes only the eye of reason yoked to the eye of flesh—in Whitehead's phrase, the dominant world-view of modernity is scientific materialism, and whether that science be the holistic science of systems theory or the subatomic physics of quantum events, science is the eye of reason linked to evidence offered by the empirical senses. In no case is the eye of contemplation or the eye of Spirit required . . . or even allowed.
The real difficulty, then, is not showing how empiricism, rationalism, and mysticism can all fit together in the Great Chain of Being; it is not showing how they can all be harmoniously integrated in a great spectrum of consciousness; it is not demonstrating that such a synthesis is coherent and complete. For that, in a sense, is the easy part. All of those statements, I believe, are true. The hard part is that modernity does not accept the higher levels themselves (the transmental, transrational, transpersonal, and contemplative modes), and thus it sees no need whatsoever for the integration. Why try to integrate science and Santa Claus?
Thus, arguing for epistemological pluralism and the different eyes of knowing (or modes of inquiry) is at best a first step. The real problem is that modernity does not accept the terms to be integrated in the first place. We will therefore have to find another path into the heart of modernity if an integration of science and religion is ever to take root in the West.
4. Science can offer "plausibility arguments" for the existence of Spirit. This is a variation on epistemological pluralism, but because it has recently generated much interest—among professionals and laypeople alike—I will discuss it separately. The idea is that, as empirical science pushes into the deepest secrets of the physical world, it discovers facts and data that seem to demand some sort of Intelligence beyond the material domain.
The standard example is the Big Bang: Where did that come from? Since the very earliest material plasma seems to have been obeying mathematical laws that themselves did not come into being with the Big Bang, must not those laws exist "in the mind of some eternal Spirit," as Sir Arthur Ed-dington, echoing Berkeley, suggested? These laws, all agree, existed prior to space and time. Thus, to the question "What existed before the Big Bang?," the answer very well might be a nonmaterial Logos governing the patterns of creation—what many would simply call God. And, this argument continues, since science discovered the Big Bang, science itself is pointing to God.
There are numerous variations on this argument, most of which are twists on the traditional argument from design, namely, that incredibly intelligent natural designs demand an incredibly intelligent Something-or-Other behind them. This is a very old argument, stretching back at least to early Greece, that has been aggressively attached to recent advances in the sciences—particularly quantum, relativistic, systems and complexity theories.
This approach is perhaps the simplest and most popular of the ways in which an alienated countermodernity has attempted to integrate science and religion. We see it in everything from The Tao of Physics (which maintains that modern physics discloses a worldview similar to that of Eastern mysticism] to the thoughtful writings of Paul Davies (e.g., The Mind of God, which maintains that "By the means of science we can truly see into the mind of God") to the Anthropic Principle (which maintains that the evolution of human beings is so improbable that the universe must have known what it was doing from the very start) to the "new holistic paradigm" approaches (which maintain that systems theory is demonstrating the same great web of life that the holistic spiritual traditions embraced).
I have a great deal of sympathy for many of those plausibility arguments. They are suggestive. They are indicative. They are certainly entertaining. But, alas, none of them can stand up to the critical philosophy of, say, Immanuel Kant or the Buddhist genius Nagarjuna, both of whom strongly demonstrated the limits of rationality in the face of the Divine. If deeply spiritual Nagarjuna is unswayed by these plausibility arguments, how must they go over with nonspiritual types? This is why the vast majority of scientists—and modernity itself—tend to take these "arguments" with mild interest at best, wild amusement at worst.
The real problem with these rational, mental, or linguistic plausibility arguments is that they are attempting to use the eye of mind to see that which can be seen only with the eye of contemplation. This confusion of levels (which is called a "category error") is particularly fatal when it comes to "arguments" for the existence of Spirit. It was precisely these inadequate and altogether unconvincing mental attempts to storm the spiritual palace that made modernity look with suspicion on any and all claims to be able to prove the existence of God. These arguments and "proofs" are simply not compelling to the modern mind, and to the spiritual mind they are inherently inadequate anyway. In no case, then, do these arguments deliver what they aspire to deliver, namely, any sort of actual spiritual knowledge.
Martin Gardner's response to these arguments is quite typical. Referring to the Anthropic Principle, Gardner points out that, according to its adherents, it comes in four successive forms, each stronger in its claims: the Weak Anthropic Principle, or WAP (the universe allows us to exist]; the Strong Anthropic Principle, or SAP (the existence of life explains the laws of the universe); the Participatory Anthropic Principle, or PAP (conscious observers are necessary to bring the universe into existence); and the Final Anthropic Principle, or FAP (if life or consciousness ends, the universe will evaporate).
To this list Gardner, speaking for modernity, adds the Completely Ridiculous Anthropic Principle, or CRAP: any who buy the first four.
5. Science itself is not knowledge of the world but merely an interpretation of the world, and therefore it has the same validity—no more, no less—as poetry and the arts. Because science refused to gracefully
take its place as one among many other valid modes of knowing, this approach attempted to cripple science in its very foundations, pulling it down against its will. It tried to level the playing field by shooting science in the head and proclaiming, "There! Now we're equal."
This approach is, of course, the essence of postmodernism. It says, in effect, that the world is not perceived, it is only interpreted. Different interpretations are equally valid ways of making sense of the world, and thus no interpretation is intrinsically better than another. Science is not a privileged conception of the world but merely one among many equivalent interpretations; science does not offer "truth" but simply its own favorite prejudice; science is not a set of universal facts but merely an arbitrary imposition of its own power drives. And in all cases, science is no more grounded in reality than is any other interpretation, so that, epistemologically speaking, there is little difference between science and poetry, logic and literature, history and mythology, fact and fiction.
Thus, this postmodern view continues, science is not governed by facts, it is governed by paradigms, and paradigms are not much more than ad hoc constructions or free-floating interpretations. As we will see in the next chapter, the notion that science is governed by paradigms was made popular by Thomas Kuhn in his now-famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which the postmodernists seized with a fury. Yet this is not at all the way Kuhn defined or described paradigms, and he strenuously denounced this abuse of his work—to no avail. But, according to this mis-Kuhnian notion of "paradigm," science is not conforming itself to actual facts, it is simply imposing its paradigms on the world at large. Since independent facts do not exist (only interpretations do), it follows, according to this account, that science is always driven by some sort of power or ideology: science itself is sexist, racist, ethnocentric, imperialistic, brutally imposing its analytic and divisive interpretations on an unwilling and innocent world. And it has no more warrant, no more final validity, than any other poetic interpretation.
Science reduced to poetry: this is now the dominant route taken by the countercultural world in an attempt to reduce the monster of science to manageable proportions. The postmodern attack on science, which attempts to shatter its epistemologi-cal foundations, is the reigning model of how to "counter" science in the postmodern world.
It is crucial to understand this postmodern attempt to level science and thus make room for "other paradigms," whether poetry, religion, mysticism, astrology, holism, post-structuralism, neopaganism, or whatnot. Aside from its important moments of truth (which I will highlight and incorporate], this entire postmodern attempt is nonetheless profoundly misguided and deeply confused. In attempting to shoot science in the head, it simply kills that which it should be integrating. It denies that which should be embraced. It sabotages the desired wedding by murdering one of the spouses.
Yet this postmodern attempt—to see science as paradigm-bound, and thus rush in to offer a "new paradigm"—is at the core of virtually every alternative, countercultural, and "new-paradigm" approach to science and religion. The idea is that science is undergoing a paradigm shift of momentous proportions, and this new paradigm is in fact commensurate with spiritual realities. The "new paradigm," it is claimed, will therefore unite science and religion for the first time in history, thus heralding the beginning of a world transformation, global in its sweep, that will usher in the beginning of a holistic, unified, web-of-life world.
And almost all of that, we will see, is based on a complete misreading of Thomas Kuhn.